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ABSTRACT
A focus on corporate culture, especially at financial institutions,
has emerged as a regulatory, public, and media priority in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. With Dodd-Frank, Congress
embraced whistleblower statutes as a key instrument to improve
corporate culture and governance, and to extirpate undesired and
unethical business practices. Despite the clear policy goals, Dodd-
Frank’s unclear statutory text has created interpretative controver-
sies. Although Dodd-Frank adds anti-arbitration provisions to
preexisting whistleblower statutes, it does not include a dedicated,
standalone anti-arbitration provision for Dodd-Frank’s new whistle-
blower cause of action.
This Article argues that courts should not allow employers to use
pre-dispute arbitration agreements to compel whistleblowers to
arbitrate their Dodd-Frank claims. To make the case, we review poli-
cy concerns for whistleblower actions that favor public actions in
public courts. We argue for a pragmatic interpretation of the statute
that protects whistleblowers and the public’s right to know by ex-
empting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowers from arbitration. The Article
draws on existing literature discussing the importance of developing
case law through court decisions, enforcement and responsiveness to
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reputational risk, and public supervision of corporate governance
issues.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Johnny Burris, forty-four, began working as a broker at
one of JPMorgan’s Arizona branches.  In his first few years, he1
earned glowing performance reviews.  Still, he had some ethical2
concerns about certain things JPMorgan asked him to do.  He was3
troubled by internal pressure to push JPMorgan’s own expensive
and underperforming investment products on his predominantly
retired clients over recommendations that were more aligned with
their interests.  Mr. Burris repeatedly brought the issue to his4
supervisors and even recorded some workplace conversations to
create a record.  Shortly thereafter, in late 2012, JPMorgan5
suspended and subsequently fired Mr. Burris.  He then took his6
concerns and evidence to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and The New York Times, thereby officially becoming a
whistleblower.  After his termination, Mr. Burris also filed an7
arbitration claim against JPMorgan, alleging that the company
retaliated against him for raising his ethical concerns.  On August8
12, 2014, the arbitration panel ruled in JPMorgan’s favor.  More9
than a year has passed since that ruling, and it now appears that
Mr. Burris was onto something.  A recently announced settlement10
revealed that JPMorgan will pay $307 million to resolve allegations
brought against it in connection with its business practices.11
Because of the SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program, autho-
rized by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
1. James B. Stewart, He Blew the Whistle, Then Came Blowback, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/he-blew-the-whistle-at-jpmorgan-chase-
then-came-the-blowback.html [https://perma.cc/5B4L-942A].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Press Release, SEC, J.P. Morgan to Pay $267 Million for Disclosure Failures (Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-283.html [https://perma.cc/P6D2-TAKQ]
(describing related settlements totaling $307 million). 
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Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank),  Mr. Burris and any other12
helpful whistleblowers that gave information related to the JPMor-
gan settlement could be awarded between 10 and 30 percent of the
two hundred million dollars collected.13
Nations around the world recognize that whistleblowers may be
able to change corporate cultures.  Indeed, corporate culture has14
emerged as a regulatory priority in the aftermath of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.  As a result, in March 2016 the United Kingdom15
introduced a new regime meant to increase accountability and
reporting.  As part of the UK financial regulation reform, financial16
institutions regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
now must appoint a senior manager to act as the whistleblowers’
champion under the Senior Managers’ Regime.  Additionally, in17
12. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code). 
13. Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues $17 Million Whistleblower Award (June 9, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-114.html [https://perma.cc/EZ54-RN45] (descri-
bing the SEC’s second-largest whistleblower award since its whistleblower program began
nearly five years ago). The SEC issued a thirty million dollar award in September 2014 and
a fourteen million dollar award in October 2013, and on June 9, 2016, the SEC announced
that it would award more than seventeen million dollars to a former company employee whose
detailed tip substantially advanced the agency’s investigation and ultimate enforcement
action. Id.
14. See Gönenç Gürkaynak & Derya Durlu, Harmonizing the Shield to Corporate Liability:
A Comparative Approach to the Legal Foundations of Corporate Compliance Programs from
Criminal Law, Employment Law, and Competition Law Perspectives, 47 INT’L LAW. 99, 101,
103-04, 119-21 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, As Regulators Focus on Culture, Wall
Street Struggles to Define It, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
as-regulators-focus-on-culture-wall-street-struggles-to-define-it-1422838659 [https://perma.cc/
FH8U-NYWP]; Robert T. Taylor, Banks Can Use ‘Code of Ethics’ to Strengthen Public Trust,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banks-can-use-code-
of-ethics-to-strengthen-public-trust-1078843-1.html [https://perma.cc/J6QX-6N8Z] (discussing
the ethical shortcomings that have tarnished the financial services sector and prompted
Federal Reserve Bank presidents in New York and Richmond and Federal Reserve Chair
Janet Yellen to address the need for better culture and ethical standards among financial
institutions).
16. See News Release, Bank of Eng., New Accountability Regime for Banks and Insurers
Comes into Force (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
news/2016/038.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7PU-TCF6].
17. See News Release, Bank of Eng., Prudential Regulation Authority Sets Out How It
Will Hold Senior Managers Accountable for Failure to Meet Its Requirements (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2015/029.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KT4V-8S4Y] (explaining that the senior management accountability initiative is part of the
UK’s banking reform program following the financial crisis of 2008 and was developed in
5
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order to increase accountability and reporting, financial institutions
across the globe have recently started hiring former spies in order
to monitor employee behavior and corporate culture more effec-
tively.18
In the United States, Congress drafted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblow-
er provisions as a tool to change corporate culture and root out
fraud, corruption, and unethical business practices.  It created an19
incentive to report unethical and unlawful conduct to the SEC by
authorizing a bounty program—allowing the SEC to reward
whistleblowers for particularly valuable tips.  This Whistleblower20
Program proved successful: the seventeen million-dollar award from
June 2016 brought “the grand total of whistleblower awards to over
eighty-five million dollars since the bounty program began in
2011.”  Additionally, Dodd-Frank strengthened existing whistle-21
blower protections by exempting whistleblowers from arbitration
response to recommendations made by the independent Parliamentary Commission on
Banking Standards in June 2013).
18. See What Are Former CIA Agents Doing at Banks?, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:10
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-02-16/what-are-former-cia-agents-doing-at-
banks [https://perma.cc/W8M6-T2X2].
19. One recent survey found that 23 percent of financial services employees believed it
likely “that fellow employees ha[d] engaged in illegal or unethical activity in order to gain an
advantage over competitors or others at the company.” ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDAN THOMAS,
UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME & LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, THE STREET, THE BULL AND THE CRISIS:
A SURVEY OF THE US & UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 4 (2015), http://www. secwhistle
bloweradvocate.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=224757 [https://perma.cc/986S-QJEN]. Un-
derscoring the importance of whistleblowing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has characterized the statutes as “government’s primary litigation tool for recovering
losses sustained as the result of fraud.” United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d
384, 388 (5th Cir. 2008).
20. Whistleblower tips have substantially improved the SEC’s investigative capabilities.
See Jennifer M. Pacella, Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable Whistleblowers
Under the Dodd-Frank Act and Internal Revenue Code, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 345, 357 (2015)
(explaining that SEC investigations are many times more effective when guided by
whistleblower tips).
21. Cliff Fonstein & Meredith-Anne Berger, SEC Issues Near Record-Breaking Whistle-
blower Award, LEXOLOGY (June 17, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
3439bafb-bc16-4a36-bc7c-f5e019507e9f [https://perma.cc/5PWY-8YU6]; Jordan Thomas, 5 Tips
for Potential Corporate Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/11/21/business/dealbook/5-tips-for-potential-corporate-whistle-blowers.html [https://
perma.cc/35E7-6NCA]; Press Release, SEC, SEC Awarding Nearly $2 Million to Three
Whistleblowers (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-41.html [https://
perma.cc/7MYK-PT3U].
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under other statutes.  These anti-arbitration provisions matter a22
great deal because different forums often have different procedures,
publicity, and outcomes.
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower section may be fairly described as
inelegantly drafted. Curiously, although Dodd-Frank added anti-
arbitration provisions to preexisting whistleblower statutes, it did
not include a dedicated, standalone anti-arbitration provision for
the new cause of action for whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank
(Dodd-Frank Claim).  This Article takes a close look at the impact23
of omitting an anti-arbitration clause for the Dodd-Frank Claim. If
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowers must seek protection in private arbi-
tration instead of a public court, the whistleblower statutes may not
achieve their intended goals.  For persons like Mr. Burris, this24
means that they may never have a day in court.
Still, Mr. Burris is not the only person who might suffer the
consequences of this puzzling omission. Sending whistleblowers to
arbitration may diminish Dodd-Frank’s efficacy in ways the legal
literature has not yet recognized. In the absence of attention,
employers may continue to resolve Dodd-Frank Claims quietly in
private arbitration proceedings, denying the public access to the
information that would have come to light had the claims been
heard in open court. As Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases become
more common, courts must determine whether employers may use
pre-dispute arbitration agreements to compel whistleblowers to
arbitrate their Dodd-Frank Claims.  Although some courts treat the25
22. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-
203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376, 1746 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012))
(prohibiting arbitration of whistleblower suits brought under the Commodity Exchange Act);
id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2)) (prohibiting
arbitration of whistleblower suits brought under Sarbanes-Oxley); id. § 1028, 124 Stat. at
2004 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b)) (granting the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau authority to prohibit arbitration).
23. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845-46 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).
24. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305, 341 (2015)
(demonstrating that the value of a claim may change dramatically from one forum to another);
Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 287-91 (explaining that legal provisions
and the remedies for enforcing them are inextricably intertwined). 
25. Compare Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding that the omission of a dedicated anti-arbitration provision means that Congress did
7
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omission of a dedicated anti-arbitration clause as dispositive, others
read the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-arbitration clause into the Dodd-
Frank Claim.26
This Article argues that underlying policy concerns strongly favor
allowing whistleblowers to litigate Dodd-Frank Claims in court,
rather than in private arbitration. It calls for either Congressional
action or a pragmatic interpretation of the statute that protects
whistleblowers. In making this argument, this Article draws on
literature regarding statutory construction and public policy, and
provides the first contribution to legal scholarship that describes
this important emerging issue of whistleblower policy.
I. THE POLICY CONTEXT
The controversy over whether Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowers be-
long in court or arbitration must be considered in light of the larger
policy issues involved. As the next Section explains, even though the
federal default policy favors arbitration, that policy should yield to
the need to improve whistleblower protection and public insight into
corporate misconduct, particularly when dealing with financial
institutions.
A. A Baseline Federal Default Policy Favors Arbitration
The federal default policy strongly favors arbitration. Enforcing
mandatory arbitration agreements conserves the judicial system’s
limited resources by relieving courts from resolving many time-in-
tensive employment disputes.  Although courts once hesitated to27
enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements for statutory employ-
not intend to exempt the Dodd-Frank Claim from arbitration), with Wiggins v. ING U.S., Inc.,
No. 3:14-CV-1089 (JCH), 2015 WL 3771646, at *7 (D. Conn. June 17, 2015), granting
reconsideration, No. 3:14-CV-01089 (JCH), 2015 WL 8779559 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2015) (“[F]or
the same reason that the court concludes that the [Sarbanes-Oxley] claim is outside the scope
of the ... arbitration clause, the court similarly concludes that the Dodd-Frank claim is outside
the scope of the ... arbitration clause and thus does not need to be submitted to arbitration.”).
26. Compare Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492, with Wiggins, 2015 WL 3771646, at *7.
27. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 (1991) (cataloging a 2166 percent rise in
employment discrimination filings between 1970 and 1989). 
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ment claims,  this position changed in the early 1990s when courts28
began accepting mandatory arbitration agreements and alternative
dispute resolution gained widespread acceptance.  In light of the29
doctrinal shift towards a default policy of enforcing mandatory
arbitration agreements, the only mechanism to guarantee litigants’
access to the courts is to include clear provisions in employment
laws that preclude mandatory arbitration.30
B. Federal Policy Encourages Whistleblowing
In what has been viewed as an unrelated area, whistleblower
claims have long been recognized as a top policy priority.  Whistle-31
blowers play a critical role in corporate governance, especially in
combating corruption and guarding the public from wrongdoing, as
well as guaranteeing accountability for the violation of laws.  Legal32
scholarship has identified five techniques that encourage whistle-
blowing: (1) Imposing and facilitating legal mandates to disclose
28. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974). Focusing on a Title VII
claim, the Court mentioned the limited discovery; the inapplicability of rules of evidence; the
arbitrator’s lack of “general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain
between the parties;” and possibly limited expertise with employment discrimination law-
suits, as well as the overall informality of an arbitration proceeding as problematic factors in
determining that arbitration should be a preferred exclusive remedy. Id. at 53, 57-58, 57 n.
18.
29. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding
that an arbitration clause required by the New York Stock Exchange and signed by a manager
in the securities industry was enforceable and could constitute an exclusive remedy). The
Court did not overrule Gardner-Denver, but distinguished it. See id. at 33-36; see also Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19, 122-23 (2001).
30. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227
(1987) (indicating that a party may use text, legislative history, and underlying purposes of
a statute to rebut the presumption that an arbitration “agreement” will be enforceable);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 204 (D. Mass.
1998) (“Instead of overruling Gilmer ... Congress could merely follow [Gilmer’s] ... suggestion
... and make clear its intent to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration.”), aff ’d, 170
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
31. The federal government has encouraged whistleblowing since the Civil War, when it
enacted the False Claims Act to track fraudulent war spending. See False Claims Act, ch. 67,
12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012)). The False Claims Act,
which was enacted in 1863, is an American federal law that makes any person who knowingly
submits a false claim to the government liable for double or more of the government’s
damages plus a penalty. See id. 
32. Kathleen Clark, White Paper on the Law of Whistleblowing 1 (Nov. 1, 2012), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2176293 [https://perma.cc/KZP7-YVWD].
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certain types of wrongdoing; (2) prohibiting retaliation against
whistleblowers and sanctioning those who do so; (3) providing reme-
dies to whistleblowers that suffer from retaliation; (4) encouraging
the establishment of platforms to facilitate whistleblowing; and (5)
offering rewards to whistleblowers who report wrongdoings.33
Dodd-Frank embraces all of these techniques to encourage
whistleblowing and facilitate the flow of information. Specifically,
although Dodd-Frank includes few explicit legal requirements to
disclose wrongdoing externally,  the statute reinforces existing34
internal disclosure mandates, including requirements that attor-
neys appearing before the SEC disclose concerns about discovered
wrongdoing up the corporate ladder and even to the board.35
Moreover, elements of the first and second techniques can also be
demonstrated in, inter alia, Dodd-Frank’s provision that prohibits
retaliation against whistleblowers for making disclosures that are
required or protected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Securities
Exchange Act, or other laws and rules subject to SEC jurisdiction.36
The third technique, which is the most important one in the context
of arbitration agreements, focuses on providing remedies to suf-
fering whistleblowers. Dodd-Frank employs this technique through
33. Id. at 2.
34. For an example of an external disclosure requirement, see Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank
requiring “resource extraction issuers” to disclose payments they make to foreign govern-
ments and the United States in annual reports that they file with the SEC and on their
websites. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-
203, § 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2220-21(2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A)).
These requirements apply to publicly traded energy and mining companies. Id.
35. Attorneys “appearing and practicing” before the SEC are required to act as internal
whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and internally report evidence of material
violations of the law. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat.
745, 784. An attorney’s failure to comply with these requirements will result in penalties and
disciplinary action. See id. (incorporated by reference to Dodd-Frank). Alternatively, an
attorney may report such information to a “qualified legal compliance committee,” if present.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(k), 205.3(c) (2016). For a more complete discussion of these conflicted
counselors, see Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for
Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620365 [https://perma.cc/JGC8-RZHJ].
36. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845-46 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806, 116 Stat. at 802-04. The Dodd-Frank Act
amended the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), by ex-
panding the scope of protected activity and setting a standard statute of limitations of three
years. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1079A, 124 Stat. at 2079 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(h)).
10
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provisions that expand employee protections against employer
retaliation as follows: (1) Excluding Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
claims from the reach of pre-dispute arbitration agreements;  (2)37
granting parties a direct private right of action in federal district
court when whistleblowers allege retaliation by their employers;38
and (3) reinstating employment with the same seniority status that
the individual would have had but for the discrimination, as well as
compensating for litigation costs and double back pay with
interest.  The fourth technique—logistically and organizationally39
facilitating whistleblowing—is demonstrated in provisions that en-
able retaliated-against whistleblowing employees to bring enforce-
ment actions directly to federal district courts, rather than first
going to the Department of Labor,  and that increase the statute of40
limitations to do so.  The fifth technique—providing financial41
incentives—is demonstrated in Dodd-Frank’s provisions that offer
awards of 10 to 30 percent of the government’s recovery to individu-
als who report securities law violations to the SEC or the CFTC if
such information results in agency sanctions larger than one million
dollars.42
C. Policy Concerns with Arbitration for Whistleblowers
Allowing employers to compel the arbitration of Dodd-Frank
claims can potentially alter how financial intermediaries address
whistleblower complaints, including how financial intermediaries
investigate and respond to internal whistleblowing.  In certain43
circumstances, private, quiet arbitration should not be a preferred
37. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845-46 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)). 
38. See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i)). 
39. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)). The Commodities Future
Trading Commission (CFTC) provision includes the same remedies, but only allows for a
recovery of back pay, without doubling but with interest. See 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(C).
40. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(B)(i)).
41. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)).
42. See id. § 748, 124 Stat. at 1739-41 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1)-(c)); id.
§ 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1) to -6(b)); see also
Clark, supra note 32, at 4.
43. See generally Mathew Andrews, Whistling in Silence: The Implications of Arbitration
on Qui Tam Claims Under the False Claims Act, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 203 (2015).
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dispute resolution mechanism. Two of the key agencies tasked with
enforcing and implementing Dodd-Frank’s provisions—the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the SEC—have
made placing appropriate limits on arbitration key agenda items.44
In fall 2015, the CFPB determined that although it would not ban
consumer arbitration clauses per se, it would seek to exclude many
class action claims from arbitration.  Similarly, in 2014 Sean45
McKessy, Chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, stated that
the SEC is “actively looking for examples of confidentiality agree-
ments, separat[ion] agreements, [and] employment agreements that
... in substance say ‘as a prerequisite to get this benefit you agree
you’re not going to come to the commission or you’re not going to
report anything to a regulator.’”  Signaling its concern about the46
issue, the SEC has indicated that agreements designed to suppress
information will result in penalties for not only the companies that
initiated them, but also the “lawyers who drafted” such agreements
or language.  This statement is meant to warn employers about47
using an employment agreement as a means to curtail or deter
Dodd-Frank reporting and claims.48
A variety of other policy concerns also weigh heavily in favor of
allowing whistleblowers to litigate their claims in public courts.
44. See generally Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and
Investor Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 793 (2015) (discussing mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses especially in the context of consumer financial and investor contracts;
explaining how they ill serve individuals; and stressing that it is well past time for the CFPB
and the SEC to use their authority, provided by Dodd-Frank following the financial crisis, to
condition the use of arbitration).
45. See Ken Sweet, Financial Regulators Move to Restrict Forced Arbitration, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-financial-regulators-
move-to-restrict-forced-arbitration-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/4446-D6H6].
46. See Brian Mahoney, SEC Warns In-House Attys Against Whistleblower Contracts,
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/518815/sec-warns-in-house-
attys-against-whistleblower-contracts [https://perma.cc/A9WW-3WZW] (omission in original)
(quoting Sean McKessy, SEC Whistleblower Chief, Remarks at the Georgetown University
Law Center Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 14, 2014)).
47. Id. (quoting Sean McKessy, SEC Whistleblower Chief, Remarks at the Georgetown
University Law Center Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 14, 2014)).
48. Id.
12
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 58 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol58/iss1/2
2016] REGULATING CULTURE 53
1. Whistleblower Litigation Develops Case Law
Historically, a major criticism of arbitration has been that it
limits the development of case law.  Disputes that are resolved49
through private arbitration do not create binding precedent for
future cases. When individuals seek to assert rights in arbitration
under new statutes, there may be no court decisions interpreting the
difficult-to-parse text, meaning that every claimant or defendant
will reargue the same controversies time and time again. Commen-
tators have argued that arbitration has pushed employees suing for
civil rights violations into individualized arbitration proceedings,
rather than into class actions.  This has resulted in a failure to50
correct systemic civil rights violations in the workplace.51
2. Reputational Risk Improves Responsiveness
During the last few decades, corporate governance scholars have
increasingly grown interested in the role of corporate reputation.52
When whistleblowers publicize disturbing issues, those issues
threaten corporate public relations and reputations, and motivate
corporate entities, and especially financial institutions, to respond.53
Of course, whistleblowers leveling public accusations may harm
a corporation’s reputation. Although it is extremely challenging for
a corporation to change unflattering perceptions about its image af-
ter public allegations have been made,  studies have shown that54
the consequences, in terms of publicity, are much worse when those
businesses possess “reputational capital,”  or a “reservoir of55
49. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
50. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will
the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000). 
51. Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002) (recognizing the limitations
of private agreements in the face of a regulatory attempt to end disability discrimination);
Sternlight, supra note 50, at 31.
52. See, e.g., John F. Mahon & Steven L. Wartick, Dealing with Stakeholders: How
Reputation, Credibility and Framing Influence the Game, 6 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 19 (2003).
53. See generally Wayne H. Decker & Thomas J. Calo, Impressions of Organizational
Responses to Whistleblower Accusations, 26 CENT. BUS. REV. 17 (2007).
54. See Andrea M. Sjovall & Andrew C. Talk, From Actions to Impressions: Cognitive
Attribution Theory and the Formation of Corporate Reputation, 7 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 269,
275-78 (2004).
55. Charles J. Fombrun et al., Opportunity Platforms and Safety Nets: Corporate
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goodwill.”  Scholars analyzing this result have argued that cor-56
porate reputation is viewed as “both a factor and a consequence of
crisis management,”  because positive corporate reputation results57
in more successful crisis management, which in turn results in
enhanced reputation.58
Limiting arbitration and promoting whistleblower actions may
help businesses improve their reputations by driving them to act in
a timely manner and to manage their crises successfully. Successful
crisis management can also involve avoiding fines or significant
legal fees, which in turn supports a corporation’s goodwill and im-
proves its public image.  But most relevant to mitigating public59
relations risks, businesses and whistleblowers are likely to be
viewed favorably if they accept and admit guilt.  Businesses that60
deny culpability, or fire the whistleblowers while accusing them of
wrongdoing, are viewed more negatively in the public’s eye, espe-
cially if the alleged culpability involves an ethical issue.61
Finally, even though reputation plays a role for all businesses, it
is a critical factor for financial intermediaries. For banks,
[r]eputational risk can be defined as the risk arising from neg-
ative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, share-
holders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant
parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to
maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and
continued access to sources of funding.62
Citizenship and Reputational Risk, 105 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 85, 86 (2000).
56. See Mahon & Wartick, supra note 52, at 19 (quoting Gary H. Jones et al., Reputation
as Reservoir: Buffering Against Loss in Times of Economic Crisis, 3 CORP. REPUTATION REV.
21 (2000)). 
57. Laura Tucker & T.C. Melewar, Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management: The
Threat and Manageability of Anti-Corporatism, 7 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 377, 382 (2005); see
Decker & Calo, supra note 53, at 17.
58. Decker & Calo, supra note 53, at 17; Tucker & Melewar, supra note 57, at 382.
59. See Decker & Calo, supra note 53, at 17.
60. Id. at 19-20.
61. Id.; see also Michael J. Gundlach et al., The Decision to Blow the Whistle: A Social
Information Processing Framework, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 107, 113-14 (2003) (noting that the
literature suggests that a business that acknowledges the truth of a whistleblower’s charges
may be judged more favorably than a business that denies the accusations).
62. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 19 (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQE6-LD3W].
14
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 58 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol58/iss1/2
2016] REGULATING CULTURE 55
Therefore, a financial institution should be especially concerned
with maintaining positive corporate reputations and minimizing
reputational risks, as those can lead to credit, market, and legal
risks, which can all have horrific effects on a bank’s earnings,
liabilities, liquidity, and capital.63
3. Increased Likelihood of Public Enforcement
The effectiveness of a law depends on the remedies it grants to
successful plaintiffs.  In the whistleblower context, a reporting em-64
ployee’s ability to utilize the remedies Dodd-Frank provides is key
for the law’s effectiveness. But if a plaintiff is not able to argue her
case and instead is forced into an arbitration proceeding, she may
perceive a disadvantage from factors such as a suspected employer
bias or limitations as to discovery or where to bring the case.  These65
disadvantages decrease the settlement value of a plaintiff ’s case
and, consequently, undermine the protections offered to whistle-
blowers under federal laws—specifically under Dodd-Frank—as well
as the likelihood of enforcing the law successfully. As a result, some
potential whistleblowers may decide to keep the whistle in the
drawer.
Similarly, requiring plaintiffs to resolve their cases via arbitra-
tion rather than lawsuits undermines federal policy by diminishing
the likelihood of public enforcement. When a whistleblower “blows”
the whistle, she is heard internally and possibly externally.  If the66
business retaliates and fires the whistleblower for raising ethical
issues, a public proceeding increases the likelihood that regulators
will hear the whistle’s blast.  Focusing on this logic, SEC Commis-67
sioner Daniel Gallagher stated that it is not surprising that
business organizations are trying to structure secretive agreements
63. Id. at 19-20.
64. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1075-76
(2004) (arguing that arbitration is a forum that weakens the rights of employees and that it
should be made clear that disputes with whistleblowers should not be subject to mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration). 
65. Id.
66. See Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?,
25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 664-67. (1999). 
67. See Cherry, supra note 64, at 1075-76.
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to avoid undesired consequences and sanctions relevant under the
law.  In the financial intermediation context, part of the reason it68
has been so difficult to prosecute financial institutions and their ex-
ecutives has been the difficulties the Department of Justice (DOJ)
faces in collecting incriminating evidence and materials.  To gain69
access to information, the DOJ has stressed the importance of
whistleblowers and how critical they are to bringing successful cases
that would develop much-needed case law.  Arbitration impairs the70
DOJ’s ability to collect information, to connect with whistleblowers,
and to bring cases.
4. Private Arbitration Limits Public’s Ability to Monitor
Open courts have long been celebrated as a tool for helping the
public have confidence in the administration of justice.  In 2013,71
concerned about public interest implications, Justice Kagan stated
in a dissent that “arbitration threatens to become ... a mechanism
easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims
and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”  This comment reflects a72
view that many business entities now attempt to suppress evidence
of wrongdoing by channeling disputes into private arbitration pro-
ceedings. Employers have come up with ways to make employees
sign various agreements relating to secrecy, including questionable
nondisclosure agreements, that require employees to report wrong-
doing to supervisors before going outside the organization, and
68. Aruna Viswanatha, Big Banks Use Loophole to Avoid Ban, WALL ST. J. (April 30,
2015, 8:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-use-loophole-to-avoid-ban-1430436535
[https://perma.cc/MV96-WQCZ]. In his comments Commissioner Gallagher mainly referred
to the type of settlements the regulators reached with the biggest financial institutions in
2014 and 2015 to pay billions of dollars in penalties in order to resolve various charges, with-
out needing to admit or deny the allegations. See id.
69. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on Financial Fraud
Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law [https://perma.
cc/JEH8-NWBS]. Nizan Geslevich Packin, Breaking Bad? Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Not Guilty
as Not Charged, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2014).
70. Holder, supra note 69.
71. See Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation
as a Response to Systematic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 443 (2013) (discussing
the public interest in open-court proceedings).
72. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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arbitration agreements that bar employees from openly discussing
their case and benefitting from a whistleblower reward.73
Nondisclosure agreements are intended to prevent employees from
leaving an employer with valuable trade secrets to benefit competi-
tors.  But, even if such agreements are enforceable as they were not74
intended to hide illegal activity, they may violate federal whistle-
blower laws.75
Similarly, it is in the public interest to have open and transparent
whistleblowing cases, which expose negative business cultures and
norms. As stated by former Attorney General Eric Holder, “No
financial fraud case is prosecutable unless we have sufficient evi-
dence of intent—we should seek to better equip investigators to
obtain this often-elusive evidence. This means, among other things,
... to incentivize witness cooperation and encourage whistleblowers
at financial firms to come forward.”  As previously discussed in this76
Part, forcing whistleblowers into mandatory arbitration has the op-
posite, chilling effect.
II. DODD-FRANK’S ODDLY DRAFTED WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
Dodd-Frank’s dense and interrelated statutory text has forced the
federal courts to wade through interpretive controversies. For
example, the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit split over how to
identify who actually qualifies as a “whistleblower” under Dodd-
Frank.  Although the Fifth Circuit requires a person to report to77
the SEC to qualify, the Second Circuit defers to the SEC’s interpre-
tation and recognizes internal reporters as whistleblowers.78
73. See Maura Irene Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit Hole: Model Rule 4.4, Intentional
Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements and the Threat of
Disqualification, Part II, 90 NEB. L. REV. 141, 142-43 (2011). See generally Bast, supra note
66, at 698-708.
74. See Richard Harroch, The Key Elements of Non-Disclosure Agreements, FORBES (Mar.
10, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/03/10/the-key-elements-of-
non-disclosure-agreements/#26331766411b [https://perma.cc/8A6H-5V9U].
75. See Bast, supra note 66, at 699-709.
76. Holder, supra note 69.
77. Compare Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (deferring to
the Commission’s interpretation and finding that inside reporting qualifies), with Asadi v.
G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that inside reporting
does not qualify).
78. The Fifth Circuit’s decision has been broadly criticized. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Pacella,
17
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The dispute concerns how much of an impact a Dodd-Frank provi-
sion incorporating a portion of Sarbanes-Oxley should have in the
term’s meaning. The statutory section creating the interlocking rela-
tionship between Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley reads as follows:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section; [or]
....
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protect-
ed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C.
7201 et seq.), this chapter, including section 78j-1(m)
of this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission.79
Dodd-Frank’s cross-reference to Sarbanes-Oxley has confounded
courts because it creates inconsistency within the statutory section.
Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower as “any individual who pro-
vides ... information relating to a violation of the securities laws to
the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by
the Commission.”  This would seemingly indicate that a whistle-80
blower protected under the statute would only be a person that
provided information to the SEC. Yet, as one court has observed,
Section 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) “is in direct conflict with [Dodd-Frank’s]
definition of a whistleblower because it provides protection to
persons who have not disclosed information to the SEC.”  To81
Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for In-
ternal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 725 (2014) (describing the Fifth Circuit’s decision as
“alarming” because it “ignores the correct rationale in the decisions of the several district
courts that have already addressed the very same issue”).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203,
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-42 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)).
81. Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013), aff ’d in part, dismissed
in part, 566 F. App’x 719 (10th Cir. 2014). The direct conflict occurs because many of the
disclosures required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley are not made to the SEC. Genberg,
935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
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resolve the conflict, the Fifth Circuit adhered to the statutory
definition and ruled that only persons that report externally of their
organization and to the SEC qualify as whistleblowers.  In contrast,82
the Second Circuit found that this baffling provision created enough
ambiguity for it to defer to the SEC’s own regulatory definition of
“whistleblower”—a definition encompassing internal reporting.83
It is difficult to determine how much of Sarbanes-Oxley Congress
actually intended to incorporate into Dodd-Frank with Section 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Specifically, it is not clear if employers may use
predispute arbitration agreements to bar public litigation of Dodd-
Frank Claims or if that provision also brought over Sarbanes-
Oxley’s anti-arbitration provision. While in many instances,
legislative history would shed light on Congressional intent,
legislative history provides no useful guidance here because
Congress, reconciling different versions of the bill, hastily added
subdivision (iii) without making its intent clear.  Remarking on the84
peculiarity of the section, the Second Circuit characterized it as “a
kind of legal Lohengrin; ... no one seems to know whence it came.”85
III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES
Given the strong policy justifications for ensuring that whistle-
blowers have access to open courts, a question remains about how
to address the issue in light of Dodd-Frank’s flawed statutory text.
This Article argues that there are two possible solutions for Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblowers: either Congressional intervention or a
pragmatic, interpretative fix from courts construing Dodd-Frank’s
dense, interrelated statutory text.
82. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627-28 (finding that inside reporting does not qualify).
83. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (deferring to the
Commission’s interpretation and finding that inside reporting qualifies).
84. Id. at 153 (“[T]here is no mention of the addition of subdivision (iii), much less its
meaning or intended purpose, in any legislative materials—not in the conference report nor
the final passage debates on Dodd-Frank in either the House or the Senate.”); Wiggins v. ING
U.S., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1089 (JCH), 2015 WL 3771646, at *6 (D. Conn. June 17, 2015)
(“[N]either party presents, nor does the court discern, any clear congressional intent to
broaden or narrow the plain meaning of ‘arising under’ in [Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-arbitration
provision].”).
85. Berman, 801 F.3d at 153 (alteration in original) (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S.
247 (2010)).
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A. The Congressional Fix
Congressional action would provide the cleanest way to resolve
the controversies. By adding an additional anti-arbitration provision
within the same section as the Dodd-Frank Claim, Congress could
clearly provide for access to public courts, as it has with so many
other whistleblower claims.  At the same time, it could also cure86
the definitional controversy over what type of reporting qualifies an
employee as a whistleblower.
Although desirable, the odds of immediate Congressional action
appear low.  In any event, without the political will generated by87
a financial crisis, it will most likely be many years before another
omnibus reform bill might incorporate this fix.
B. The Interpretative Fix
From a pragmatic perspective, the best way to address the issue
in the interim may be a judicial interpretation that reads an
existing anti-arbitration provision into the Dodd-Frank Claim.
Legal pragmatists recognize that statutory interpretation is a
difficult task and argue that it should be informed by taking into
account the consequences of a particular interpretation.  Other88
influential voices criticize this approach as cynical and amorphous,
dignifying results-oriented reasoning.  A pragmatic approach may89
be more acceptable when courts face particularly challenging
interpretative tasks, such as an internally inconsistent statutory
section without any legislative history.90
86. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
87. See Lauren French, Congress Setting New Bar for Doing Nothing, POLITICO (Mar. 21,
2016, 5:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/congress-supreme-court-budget-do-
nothing-221057 [https://perma.cc/KB6P-NZVF].
88. Douglas Lind, The Mismeasurement of Legal Pragmatism, 4 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 213,
216 (2012) (“[P]ragmatism is indeed a philosophy that considers consequences to be relevant
in matters of deliberation and judgment.”).
89. See David Luban, What’s Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
43, 43 (1996); Richard H. Weisberg, It’s a Positivist, It’s a Pragmatist, It’s a Codifier!
Reflections on Nietzsche and Stendhal, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 85 (1996) (reproaching legal
pragmatism for an “amorphous nature”).
90. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 683, 683 (2004)
(“Only in exceptional circumstances, however, will the pragmatic judge give controlling weight
to systemic consequences.”).
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The interpretative issue for Dodd-Frank’s whistleblowers is
whether the statutory cross-reference to Sarbanes-Oxley, that “legal
Lohengrin,” also incorporates Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-arbitration pro-
vision.  The anti-arbitration provision that Dodd-Frank added to91
Sarbanes-Oxley provides that “[n]o predispute arbitration agree-
ment shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbi-
tration of a dispute arising under this section.”  This has given rise92
to a dispute as to what it means to arise under that section. If Dodd-
Frank Claims also arise under that section, then whistleblowers
may bring court actions. If they do not arise under that section, then
employers may funnel the claims to private arbitration proceedings.
In considering this issue, most courts to reach it thus far have
chosen to read the statute narrowly and have found that the
Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-arbitration provision does not extend to
Dodd-Frank Claims.  Despite this majority reading, an alternative93
interpretation has emerged, finding that Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-arbi-
tration provision extends to Dodd-Frank Claims to the extent that
those claims also arise under Sarbanes-Oxley.94
1. The Current Majority View Favors Arbitration
Most courts have adopted the narrow approach because the
relatively short statutory section creating the Dodd-Frank Claim
does not include its own anti-arbitration provision within its text.95
These courts pointed out that in adding the anti-arbitration pro-
vision to Sarbanes-Oxley and other existing causes of action,
Congress demonstrated that it knew how to provide for forum choice
91. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds, Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
93. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2014); Murray v.
UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(KPF), 2014 WL 285093, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014)
(holding that the Anti-Retaliation Provision “does not include a prohibition against predispute
arbitration agreements”), appeal denied, No. 12 Civ. 5914 (KPF), 2014 WL 1316472, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2014); Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., No. SACV 11-00734-CJC(JCGx), 2011 WL
4442790, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (same).
94. See Wiggins v. ING U.S., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1089 (JCH), 2015 WL 3771646, at *7 (D.
Conn. June 17, 2015). 
95. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492-93; Murray, 2014 WL 285093, at *8-9; Ruhe, 2011 WL
4442790, at *4.
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had it wanted to do so.  As the Supreme Court has explained,96
“when Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it
is presumed to have acted intentionally.”  By not including an anti-97
arbitration clause in the text of the Dodd-Frank Claim, Congress
seemingly left undisturbed the federal policy strongly favoring
arbitration.  Although a Congressional choice to allow employers to98
compel Dodd-Frank Claims into arbitration while exempting many
other whistleblower claims from arbitration might appear mystify-
ing, the Third Circuit speculated that the omission of an additional
anti-arbitration provision for Dodd-Frank might reflect some
legislative compromise.99
2. The Minority View Grants Access to Public Courts
Not all courts have construed the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-arbitration
provision narrowly.  In a decision from the District Court of Con-100
necticut, which has been appealed to the Second Circuit, Chief
Judge Hall focused on what it means for a cause of action to “arise
under” a particular statutory section.  For guidance construing the101
language, the court turned to Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
in which the Supreme Court found that a claim arises under any
statutory provision that “provides a necessary element of the
96. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492-93; Murray, 2014 WL 285093, at *8-9; Ruhe, 2011 WL
4442790, at *4.
97. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
98. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (recog-
nizing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”).
99. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493; see also John K. Lisman, Arbitration Agreement
Arbitrage?: Statutory Discrepancy Leads to Third Circuit Victory for Dodd-Frank Whistle-
blower Defendants in Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 60 VILL. L. REV. 753, 767
(2015) (referring to the omission of an anti-arbitration provision as an “odd discrepancy”).
100. While not directly on point, the Fourth Circuit described the broad scope of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s anti-arbitration provision in Santoro v. Accenture Federal Services, LLC, declaring
that the anti-arbitration clause Dodd-Frank added to Sarbanes-Oxley “represents a clear
Congressional command that Dodd-Frank whistleblower claims are not subject to predispute
arbitration.” 748 F.3d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 2014). Despite using this broad language for
whistleblower claims, the Fourth Circuit decision addressed a different issue—whether Dodd-
Frank invalidated all pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Id. The Fourth Circuit did not
address the narrow issue of the discrepancy between the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
provision and the Dodd-Frank Claim. Id.
101. See Wiggins v. ING U.S. Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1089 (JCH), 2015 WL 3771646, at *6-7 (D.
Conn. June 17, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-2262 (2d Cir. July 16, 2015).
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plaintiff ’s claim for relief.”  Because Dodd-Frank’s legal Lohengrin102
protects whistleblowers making disclosures protected under Sar-
banes-Oxley, those whistleblowers’ claims may also arise under
Sarbanes-Oxley. If Dodd-Frank Claims arise under Sarbanes-Oxley,
they should also be protected by its anti-arbitration provision.103
Although it is a close issue, this Article argues that this broader
interpretation remains sufficiently faithful to the statute’s inter-
nally inconsistent text and better serves the statute’s objectives. If
a claim is made possible by a particular statute, it may be fairly
described as “arising under” that statute even if it also arises under
a different statute.  Here, a whistleblower’s Dodd-Frank Claim104
may be made possible by, and thus arise under, the Sarbanes-Oxley
section containing the anti-arbitration provision.
This reading is not without consequences. Granting Sarbanes-
Oxley’s whistleblowers the right to sue under Dodd-Frank assures
that Sarbanes-Oxley’s own whistleblower provision will likely see
diminished use. Unlike Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley requires
whistleblower claimants to first exhaust their administrative rem-
edies by filing an administrative complaint with the Secretary of
Labor.  In addition, it provides only back pay with interest while105
Dodd-Frank provides for twice “the amount of back pay otherwise
owed to the individual, with interest.”  Given the benefits of106
increased protections and remedies for whistleblowers, this Article
argues a potential shift toward increased use of the Dodd-Frank
Claim would be a positive one.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to draw attention to a new Dodd-Frank contro-
versy and the impact it may have on efforts to use whistleblower
102. 541 U.S. 369, 376 (2004).
103. Of course, the statute protects a variety of conduct, giving rise to the possibility that
some Dodd-Frank Claims may arise under Sarbanes-Oxley while others may not, depending
on the underlying facts. See Umang Desai, Comment, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 450-52 (2012) (outlining Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower and retaliation claims). 
104. See Jones, 541 U.S. at 383 (recognizing that a cause of action may arise under a
statute if the “plaintiff ’s claim against the defendant was made possible” by the statute).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(c) (2016).
106. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii).
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statutes to improve corporate governance and reform corporate cul-
ture in financial institutions. The content of this culture matters.107
A focus on culture should be balanced against strengthening
disclosure requirements. Indeed, the legal literature describes how
increased disclosure advances efficiency and governance.  But even108
though disclosure requirements are helpful in promoting transpar-
ency, disclosure requirements may not measure up to substantial
regulation that alters negative market incentives or undesired
economic incentives.  Therefore, although mandating disclosure is109
a key component of regulating financial markets, relying on it alone
as a holistic panacea would be a mistake. Given the importance of
business culture in our modern society, and the consequences that
such culture and behavioral norms have, it is extremely important
to nudge individuals as well as businesses to promote increased
norms of accountability and transparency. This is also the message
that regulators have been delivering in the years following the
financial crisis.  Limiting arbitration and enabling whistleblowers110
to pursue their claims will help promote Dodd-Frank’s goals and
improve corporate culture.
107. See Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 861, 862-64 (2015) (explaining how financial industry culture contributes to systemic risk).
108. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1606-08 (2012).
109. Id. at 1715; Martin F. Hellwig, Market Discipline, Information Processing and
Corporate Governance 6, 7, 19 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint
No. 2005/19, 2005) (arguing that market discipline works only if market actors have sufficient
incentives to fulfill their monitoring role and there are no impediments to information
signals).
110. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
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